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SUMMARY 
To combat reactive maintenance and the “run-to-failure” asset management model, 
the U.S. Air Force has taken steps to ensure facility condition assessment tracking and asset 
service life monitoring. The purpose of this study is to investigate how effectively the Air 
Force has embraced the sustainment of assets and to determine if such trends can be 
observed at the base level. To do this, a study of the Air Force’s overall spending is 
analyzed, comparing the amount of funds requested to support asset preservation versus 
asset restoration over the last four years. A hierarchical linear analysis is then accomplished 
for a case study of five bases for fiscal years 2010 to mid-2017. This has determined the 
possible effects of preventive maintenance on reactive maintenance and repair work orders. 
Results of the macro-study reveal that the percentage of total funds requested for 
sustainment projects has increased since 2013. In the fiscal year (FY) 2013, only 10% of 
the total requested funds were assigned to sustainment projects. By the FY 2017, 
sustainment funds requested made up 36% of the total. Though the transitioning nature of 
asset management, project-type descriptions, and the continued optimization of the scoring 
model are factors to consider, it appears that asset sustainment has become more prevalent. 
The results of the case study suggest that there is little correlation between preventive 
maintenance and corrective maintenance trends. More data as preventive asset 
management integrates into practice may reveal different results, but at this stage, 
preventive maintenance has neither consistently increased or appear to have effected 
reactive maintenance frequency, labor hours, or cost. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will cover the background to the research and detail the issues facing 
Air Force infrastructure. Then, the research questions will be identified. The chapter will 
close with an overview of the remainder of the paper. 
1.1 Background 
Asset management is a continually developing means to optimize how organizations 
purchase, care for, and dispose of resources. Optimal asset management will ensure that 
facilities and their systems operate effectively throughout and even beyond their 
manufacturer-determined useful life. Conversely, ineffective asset management can cause 
lasting effects and decrease an organization’s ability to correct deficiencies over time. The 
United States Air Force is one such organization; one that is trying to correct a history of 
inefficient resource management strategies. Today, degradation plagues federally-owned 
facilities and assets, a situation caused by several issues. First, there was a focus on the 
construction costs for facilities and an ignorance of the operations and maintenance costs 
required to keep the facility functional. Initial construction is certainly expensive, however 
over the life of a facility it is only 29% of a buildings’ total cost (Gardner, 2013). Second, 
due to the first issue, funds allocated for appropriate maintenance and repair have been 
insufficient. The struggle to determine the best method suited to use taxpayer dollars on 
asset maintenance and repair (M&R) work has been ongoing. In 1989, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) proposed to Congress a plan to ensure that the built environment could be 
sustained by asking for one percent of the plant replacement value (PRV) annually for 
recurring work and service calls, and 0.75 percent of the PRV annually for non-recurring 
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work to include minor construction (Ottoman, 1997). However, in a benchmarking study 
related to M&R and recapitalization, a minimum of two percent of the PRV should be 
allocated to M&R and another two percent to non-recurring recapitalization annually 
(Westfall, 2010). A third issue, compounding the problem, was the fact that the DoD 
regarded operations and maintenance (O&M) as a residual funding category and only 
allocated money toward it after all other needs were met. Fourth, even as the DoD sought 
to save money by demolishing unneeded buildings, M&R budgets have decreased faster 
than the amount of space to be maintained (GAO, 1997). Fifth, the lack of funding coupled 
with a “run-to-failure” mentality led to continually deferred maintenance. Finally, while 
the DoD was facing aging facilities, it failed to assign accountability among leadership for 
assets and lacked the data to defend maintenance and repair budgets (NRC, 2012). In 1996, 
the Federal Facilities Council identified the need to make preventive maintenance the 
“cornerstone of a solid cost-effective [maintenance and repair] program” 
(NationalAcademies, 1996). The call for increased preventive maintenance has driven the 
need to identify those maintenance needs and when during an asset’s life they should be 
accomplished. 
In 2013, the DoD owned 2.3 billion square feet of real estate and spent 55% of its 
real property maintenance funds on emergency reactive maintenance or repair work. The 
financial pressures which led to decreased efforts to inspect aging infrastructure caused the 
neglect of systems which may have benefitted from preventive maintenance. Avoiding 
reactive repair work and keeping DoD budgeting decisions within the preventive and 
proactive maintenance domain required a method by which buildings, their systems, and 
their components could be tracked throughout their lifecycle. The system, developed by 
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the Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC), was called the BUILDER 
Sustainment Management System (SMS) and was implemented as an Air Force Asset 
Management tool in 2013 ("BUILDER Sustainment Management System," 2014). 
The BUILDER system is a program which lists all the facilities within a base. From 
there, each facility is broken down into systems (for example, the HVAC system), 
components (a chiller unit), and subcomponents (the compressor). Ideally, each 
subcomponent, component, system, and facility is assessed and assigned a condition index 
between zero (failed) and 100 (new condition). Based on this condition index, the useful 
life of the infrastructure is tracked, and maintenance can be scheduled to prevent failure 
and extend useful life. The condition index is used as part of the Air Force’s risk assessment 
scoring model, which determines the likelihood of failure and the consequence of that 
failure. Lower condition indexes signify that components are at greater risk, therefore 
allowing the Air Force to determine which projects should be funded at what time to 
prevent failure and adequately extend the useful life of assets. 
1.2 Research Questions 
When BUILDER and the risk-based scoring model were introduced to improve the 
asset management program for the U.S. Air Force, the predicted outcomes included 
improved investment strategies, lifecycle tracking for infrastructure, complete asset 
accountability, real estate value accuracy, and asset condition awareness. One of the most 
significant goals of these changes was to motivate a transition from a reactive maintenance 
approach to a deliberate maintenance strategy. To measure the effectiveness of the changes, 
two levels of analysis are utilized. The first seeks to determine if Air Force asset managers 
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have made an effort to request more funding for projects to sustain assets over the long 
term. The second level of analysis will determine, using case studies, the effect of 
preventive maintenance on the number, labor hours, and cost of reactive maintenance. The 
motivation for this research stemmed from curiosity about these trends and effects: has the 
Air Force been successful in requesting more funds towards sustaining existing 
infrastructure? Are these trends seen Air Force-wide as well as at base-level? Have these 
trends affected the amount of reactive maintenance and repair work required at the base-
level? The answers to these questions could help determine the effectiveness of the changed 
brought about with the BUILDER software and the preventive maintenance asset 
management strategy. 
1.3 Overview 
This thesis begins with a literature review which will delve into the importance of 
and differences between different types of maintenance, the value of well-timed 
maintenance, and asset management strategies that are recommended for successful 
budgeting. It will also assess the Air Force Planning and Programming rules, project 
funding process, and how BUILDER works and is implemented to assist in the 
understanding of the research. The research method will then be described, followed by the 
results. The following discussion will describe the implications of the results and the 
limitations of the study. Finally, the conclusions section will summarize the findings and 
recommend additional studies based on the results discussed in this paper. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This chapter will first discuss the different types of maintenance strategies and their 
characteristics. The benefits of preventive maintenance, along with evidence from 
literature, will follow. Risk matrices will be introduced before delving into the BUILDER 
program and the Air Force risk-based scoring model.  
2.1 Maintenance Strategies 
 In an asset management guide written by the Army Corps of Engineers, four types 
of maintenance are identified: reactive, preventive, predictive, and proactive. Reactive 
maintenance, also known as “run-to-failure” or “corrective” maintenance, is fixing what 
has broken. Preventive maintenance is regularly scheduled inspection, cleaning, 
lubricating, etc. Predictive maintenance is maintenance based on inspection or performance 
data. Finally, proactive maintenance is designing or installing equipment to more 
effectively improve maintenance (Chalifoux & Baird, 1999). Where required maintenance 
can be predicted, it is in the facility manager’s best interest to schedule operations in 
advance as it will decrease the rate of failure. A visual for this is provided by the Condition 
Based Maintenance Plus DoD Guidebook. Figure 1 shows how assets experience a 
decreasing rate of failure as the type of maintenance approach shifts from corrective to 
preventive, predictive, and proactive respectively. For each approach, pros and cons are 
listed based on the requirements to accomplish each approach. 
 6 
 
Figure 1: Trend in Failure Rates According to the Maintenance Approach (Bell, 
2008) 
 
2.2 Preventive Maintenance 
The science behind the argument which states that proactively and preventively 
maintaining an asset can save more money in the long run than the initial cost of the 
building itself is not clear-cut. Facilities and their systems are becoming increasingly 
intricate with new technology, environmental and building code standards, and evolving 
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user requirements. The purpose and goals of the company also affect the asset management 
principles they adopt. An example of success can be found in a study done on an Egyptian 
Glass Company. They experienced many benefits by switching from reactive maintenance 
to proactive maintenance such as increased through-put, decreased production losses, 
increased equipment effectiveness, and cost savings from system failure prevention (Ismail 
Mostafa, 2004). The method to bring about change came in the form of software which 
could monitor asset condition data and assess maintenance needs. This type of software is 
increasingly invaluable as the complexity of building components and number of assets 
increases. Technologies designed to track, prioritize, and predict work can keep systems 
functioning properly before failure occurs. The more difficult it is to manage and schedule 
maintenance and repair work, the greater the risk of purely reactive operations becomes. 
Servicing component breakdowns and system failures takes more time, effort, and money 
to accomplish than it would have cost before the breakdown occurred (Marrano, 2010). 
The most apparent advantage to making the maintenance strategy of a company more 
effective is the economic impact. By keeping facilities and facility components running 
smoothly, fewer spending spikes will be observed as fewer assets will break down or fail 
in ways that require contracted repair or replacement. In a study on Italian manufacturing 
firms, a survey-based empirical research strategy was employed to determine how user 
satisfaction was impacted by preventive and condition-based maintenance. For 
approximately 100 firms, preventive and condition-based maintenance produced greater 
satisfaction in terms of equipment availability performance, regardless of the firm’s size 
(Chinese & Ghirardo, 2010). Also, inconveniences like relocating personnel in an office 
while repair work is completed, for example, will be less frequent. Budgeting will become 
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easier as sustainment management systems will be able to track the conditions of assets 
and identify approximately when maintenance must occur. Assets will also last longer, 
reducing long-term costs associated with replacement. The Engineer Research and 
Development Center (ERDC) provided conceptual graphs that show the potential impact 
of increasing preventive maintenance and repair based on the condition of the asset over 
time (Figure 2 & Figure 3). Along the y-axis, CI stands for the Condition Index of an asset, 
were a score of 100 represents a brand new or perfect asset condition and a score of 0 
representing total failure. The service life gain shown in Figure 3 is a result of a well-timed 
repair. 
 




Figure 3: Asset Service Life (SL) when Appropriate Maintenance or Repair is 
Conducted (Marrano, 2010) 
 
One of the benefits of a well-timed maintenance program is economic. A study 
conducted to determine if different maintenance strategies were linked to performance was 
accomplished using a survey. Plant managers and maintenance managers provided 
information about their plants and responded to questions concerning maintenance 
practices and performance measures for the past two years. Maintenance strategies were 
defined as either aggressive, proactive, or reactive based on the responses. Finally, the 
performance measures were compared between the three maintenance types. The results 
revealed a negative correlation between companies that conducted reactive maintenance 
and reductions in production costs. For proactive maintenance, the correlation with reduced 
production costs was positive (Swanson, 2001). Determining a system to rank maintenance 
work based on urgency or, the importance of an asset and the impact if its failure, is a 
valuable method for businesses. This fact is urged in a paper written in 1978 entitled 
Reliability Centered Maintenance, a report sponsored by the DoD. The document contains 
details of a comprehensive study conducted to outline the logical discipline of the tried-
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and-true maintenance practices of United Airlines. The DoD was looking for an in-depth 
plan to implement for its own aircraft. The publication encourages identifying the most 
valuable assets based on the impact of their failure to the overall business strategy – a risk-
based methodology (Nowlan & Heap, 1978). Labi (2014) discusses risk assessment in great 
detail. He describes the risk assessment framework as a method to determine how soon 
things will go wrong and what the consequences of that failure will be (Labi, 2014). Using 
a risk-based methodology as a guideline for asset maintenance, organizations can 
determine the threat to functionality based on the importance of an asset and how likely a 
failure will occur. For example, if a company has two HVAC units, one that services 
expensive electronic equipment and another that services office space, it may decide that 
the consequence of failure for the unit servicing the electronics is more severe than the 
consequence of failure for the unit servicing the offices. However, if the unit servicing the 
office space has a higher likelihood of failure, it may be in the company’s best interest to 
service that one first. The decision-making process is not one-dimensional. To help 
visualize the Simplified Risk Matrix, refer to Figure 4. It shows the levels of risk for a high 
threat consequence and low threat consequence versus a high threat likelihood and a low 
threat consequence. An asset with low threat likelihood and low threat consequence 
corresponds to a low risk. Conversely, an asset with high threat likelihood and high threat 




Figure 4: Simplified Risk Matrix (Labi, 2014) 
 
 Decisions considering risk are not one-dimensional and both the consequence and 
likelihood will change over time. In the example with the HVAC units, the consequence 
may change with the seasons, employee demographics, and updated technologies. 
Similarly, the likelihood of failure will typically increase as the asset ages and decrease 
with subsequent repairs. Effective maintenance strategies should directly relate to the 
condition and operation status of the asset as it changes over time. The facility and its 
components’ lifecycle cost can be decreased and its lifecycle increased when maintenance 
schedules are built on need as opposed to assumptions. Maintenance schedules should thus 
consider the capacity, material, and use of assets (Iijima & Takata, 2016). 
2.3 BUILDER and the Risk-Based Project Scoring Model 
 The BUILDER Sustainment Management System is a database which functions 
like a Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS). It is important to note 
that CMMS has many functions beyond the scope of BUILDER, but as far as listing the 
assets, reporting their condition, and displaying lifecycle data, the systems are comparable. 
BUILDER breaks assets down into four distinct levels. The highest level is the facility 
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level, then the systems within that facility, the components of that system, and finally the 
subcomponents (the lowest level). The inventory uses the UniFormat II classification 
system (Grussing, 2012). The first challenge a company faces when implementing 
BUILDER is the inventory. Like a CMMS, all the assets owned by the company must be 
imported or loaded into the system. As many details as are available should be included 
such as manufacturer, make/model, serial number, year installed, and previous 
maintenance and repair work. This process can take a significant amount of time when 
inventories are non-existent or in different formats throughout the enterprise. A DoD-
specific data point is the Mission Dependency Index (MDI). This value indicates the 
mission-related importance of an asset and therefore helps to determine the consequence 
of failure (Grussing, Gunderson, et al., 2010). Though BUILDER can store ownership 
information (like which squadron is assigned to a building), it is not meant to function like 
a Computer-Aided Facility Management (CAFM) program or an Integrated Workplace 
Management System (IWMS). Such functions within the Air Force are conducted using 
ACES-RP (Automated Civil Engineer System – Real Property) and are not within 
BUILDER’s scope. 
 Once the inventory has been loaded into the BULIDER software, the next step is 
condition assessments. The program requires a “starting point” from which to build 
prediction models. The condition of an asset is represented by a number between zero and 
100. Maintenance personnel will inspect each asset and assign it a condition index based 
on Table 1. The table shows a range of condition indexes to describe varying levels of 
functionality in the first row (where FI stands for Functionality Index). The second row 
provides a description of the condition of the facility or asset according to the 
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corresponding functionality index (Grussing, Marrano, & Walters, 2010). While 
determining the exact value within the range is a subjective decision, the table provides a 
higher level of guidance than was utilized in the past when condition assessments were not 
conducted. 
Table 1: Functionality Index Interval Descriptions (Grussing, Marrano, et al., 2010) 
 
  
When the inventory is uploaded and condition assessments are complete, the 
BUILDER software will use colors to indicate the condition of assets. A red color will 
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indicate an asset in poor condition, a yellow color will indicate an asset in moderate 
condition, and a green asset will indicate an asset in good condition. BUILDER will also 
build a graph to display the predicted life of an asset. As components or subcomponents 
are maintained, repaired, or replaced, the condition index will be updated and the graph 
will display an upgraded lifecycle prediction. While BULIDER will not schedule work, or 
have maintenance personnel data like a CMMS, it can be a useful tool in risk-based and 
preventive maintenance strategies. 
To understand the project scoring model, it is important to comprehend the 
vocabulary and abbreviations that will follow. Program Element Codes (PECs) describe 
the funding pool through which a project will be funded. Projects are assigned PECs based 
on their Element of Expense Investment Codes (EEICs) which designate different types of 
work. These EEICs are more specific about the type of work and describe maintenance, 
repair, construction, and demolition, to name a few. Maintenance work is always 
considered a sustainment project because it is keeping an asset in working condition, but 
repair work can be either sustainment (SUS) or restoration and modernization (R&M), 
depending on the purpose of the repair. For example, it is expected that carpet will need to 
be replaced at regular intervals so although this would be considered repair work, it is 
classified as SUS because it is scheduled and designed to enable assets to reach their 
expected service life. R&M repair work is work needed to restore assets damaged due to 
poor sustainment practices or accidents like fire or natural disasters (USAF/A4C, 2016). 
 Projects are listed based on importance and condition or by consequence of failure 
and probability of failure. Figure 5 shows the Air Force project scoring model (very similar 
to the risk matrix described by Labi). 
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Figure 5: The Air Force Project Budgeting Scoring Model (Barrera & Payne, 2015) 
 
 The consequence of failure is determined based on two factors: the base 
commander’s priorities and the mission dependency index, which classifies how vital the 
asset is to the overall mission. The probability of failure is a value determined by the 
condition index identified by BUILDER. The lower the condition index, the poorer the 
condition of the asset and, therefore, the higher the probability of failure.  
 The scoring system best described as follows: 
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“A risk-based framework provides a simple, standardized way for 
installation commanders to accurately capture mission impact against the 
physical condition of key assets. This framework is both executable at the 
tactical level and informative at the strategic level.” (Barrera & Payne, 
2016) 
The projects, once listed based on this risk-management model, are submitted to compete 
for a finite amount of funding for civil engineering projects. Once the projects are scored 
Air Force-wide, an approved list is released called the Air Force Comprehensive Asset 
Management Plan (AFCAMP). This list designates the monetary pool through which each 
project will be funded. Details on the AFCAMP will be discussed in the Methods section. 
 Sustainment management systems like BUILDER will easily integrate into 
Building Information Modeling (BIM) technology. Qing, Tao, and Ping (2014) propose a 
Building Lifecycle Management Platform for this integration. The system they describe 
combines BIM, usually utilized to design and construct a project, with Lifecycle 
Management (or sustainment management), which is a function of BUILDER. In this way, 
new projects can populate the lifecycle management component, thereby eliminating the 
need for initial condition assessments. With all the design and construction information 
already available, sustainment management systems will be even more effective as BIM 
data is carried throughout a facility’s useful life. With proper continuity of information and 
updates, sustainment management systems could greatly simplify maintenance procedures 
(Qing, Tao, & Ping, 2014).   
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
 As mentioned in the introduction, two studies were accomplished the answer the 
research questions. The first was a macro-analysis, using data from the global U.S. Air 
Force. The second considered five individual bases. In this section, the methodologies for 
both studies is described. 
3.1 The Macro-Study Methodology  
The first analysis conducted was at a macro-level: it considered Air Force spending 
globally based on the AFCAMPs. As previously mentioned, the AFCAMPs are records of 
the amount of funds requested for various work types, or “pools” of money. The pools of 
interest to this research were PEC’s which indicated SUS and R&M projects. The budget 
analysis was conducted using available data from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2017. 
Air Force bases worldwide submit project lists annually for the upcoming fiscal year, to 
include projects desired for the following year if said project is large or complicated and 
requires time for design or additional planning. The data was requested from the 
Construction Tasking Order Representative at the Air Force Civil Engineer Center in the 
spring of 2017. Five spreadsheets, one for each fiscal year, detailed the list of projects 
requested for that year and identified which have been approved for funding. Altogether, 
there were approximately 5,500 projects requested each year, with an average of 2,700 
accepted for funding. The projects accepted for funding were included in the analysis, 
resulting in approximately 13,400 data points. SUS requirements are projects which keep 
assets in good working order. R&M requirements are projects designed to fix assets that 
have failed or have nearly failed. The term “other” describes “everything else,” which 
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includes demolition, environmental, and new construction projects. The sum of the SUS, 
R&M, and other projects were then determined. “Other” projects identify requests that are 
funded using different pools such as demolition, environmental, energy, design projects. 
These results were analyzed by determining the percentage of the total approved funds on 
the AFCAMP for each funding pool. This way, the percentage of money allocated for SUS 
projects versus R&M projects could be compared over time. 
3.2 The Case Study Methodology 
 The case study was conducted on five different bases within the continental U.S. 
between fiscal years 2010 to June 2017. The data, made available by the Air Force Life 
Cycle Management Center, provided information on every work order from those bases in 
those years as recorded in the Interim Work Information Management System (IWIMS). 
IWIMS was a CMMS used by the Air Force before beginning to transition to Tririga in 
2015. The data included any work order which was completed, in progress, drafted, or 
backlogged. This means that any negative trends are not the product of a growing backlog, 
but a representation of less work identified for that LUC. 
The data provided the fiscal year, base name, facility number, craft, Labor Utilization 
Code (LUC), labor hours, and cost for each work order. Fiscal year (FY) is a budgeting 
period from October of the previous year until the end of September in the identified year. 
For example, FY 2014 is a period of time between October 1, 2013, through September 30, 
2014. The base name has been replaced with identifiers 1-5 to protect the identity of case 
study participants. Each base has similar population sizes and similar geographic locations 
(to ensure comparable climates), but each belongs to a different Air Force Major 
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Command. This means simply that their missions, type of equipment and facilities, and 
requirements differ. The facility numbers are identifiers for different facilities and 
infrastructure within the bases. The craft identifies the nature of the work accomplished. 
Some examples of crafts include electric system, pavement, and HVAC work. Some craft 
identifiers, such as landscaping and entomology, were eliminated from the dataset as they 
were determined irrelevant. Additionally, because there were so many categories of craft 
and some had very few observations, crafts were generalized into six systems groups: plant 
operations (water, heat, electric, waste), primary facility systems (electric, plumbing, 
HVAC), horizontal and vertical construction (roads/sidewalks, facilities), environmental 
controls and alarm systems, specialized teams and systems, and contractor work/project 
management. These variables are treated as categorical in the analysis and their descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 2. Column one shows the variable, column two displays the 
number of observations for that variable, and column three shows the percentage of the 
total N observations in the overall dataset. Note that facility number is not shown due to 
the large number of distinct values. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Variables 
Categorical Variables  N Percent 
Fiscal Year   
   2010 8,352 12.7 
   2011 7,885 11.9 
   2012 8,545 12.9 
   2013 8,622 13.1 
   2014 8,915 13.5 
   2015 9,008 13.6 
   2016 9,213 14.0 
   2017 5,456 8.3 
Base Code   
   1 18,338 27.8 
   2 10,457 15.8 
   3 9,021 13.7 
   4 6,965 10.6 
   5 21,215 32.1 
System Groupings   
   Plant Operations (water, heat, electric, waste) 767 1.2 
   Primary Facility Systems (electric, plumbing, HVAC) 38,210 57.9 
   Horizontal/Vertical construction (roads/sidewalks, facilities) 12,844 19.5 
   Environmental controls and Alarm systems 9,576 14.5 
   Specialized teams and systems 2,816 4.3 
   Contractor work/project management 1,783 2.7 
Note.  Total N = 65,996.  There are 2,976 facilities nested in the five bases. 
 
The LUCs identify the type of work, for example, emergency, routine, or urgent 
work. Though 16 LUCs exist, the ones of interest to this study were LUC 11, 12, 14, 16, 
18, 19, which correspond to recurring, emergency, urgent, recurring, work requests, and 
plant operations, respectively. Other LUCs, primarily those used to indicate indirect work 
such as supervision and leave, were eliminated from the dataset. Recurring work is 
repetitive work expected to be done at regular intervals and usually identified by the shop 
expected to complete the work. This type of work includes preventive maintenance. 
Emergency work is work that must be responded to immediately and usually poses a risk 
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to life, health, or safety. This type of work could be a pipe burst, electrical line down, or a 
power outage. Emergency work can be the result of failed or delinquent preventive 
maintenance. Urgent work must be responded to quickly but does not pose a significant 
threat to operational effectiveness or government property. Routine work is corrective 
maintenance and most times it is identified by the users within a facility. Emergency, 
urgent, and routine work are all considered corrective maintenance. Work requests include 
all other maintenance and repair requests from users, and plant operations are actions 
required to continue providing utilities which are generated by the base itself (like 
electricity production or waste water treatment). After trimming and reformatting of the 
data, a column for count, labor hours, and cost were added. The count column identified 
how many times a particular type of work (LUC) was accomplished to a specific facility 
within a specific base within a specific year. Labor hours and cost columns showed the 
sum of the labor hours or cost corresponding to a type of work within the facility within 
the base within the year. The cost-values were adjusted for inflation and translated into 
2017 values using the average inflation rate between January 2010 and June 2017 of 1.73%. 
Finally, the data was put into long-form wherein each variable is a column-heading, 
allowing for the analysis of specific measurements of LUCs to be studied as variables. A 
column for each LUC measured in each of the three ways mentioned (count, labor hours, 
and cost) was created. A summary of the data in this form is shown in Table 3. The columns 
display the variable, the number of observations, minimum values, maximum values, the 
mean, and the standard deviation (SD). Because some of the LUC-cost data points were 
negative values, they were excluded, resulting in a smaller N than the total N of 65,996. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Outcomes of the Case Study 
Variable Observations Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Recurring Work - Count 65,996 0 8 0.53 0.58 
Emergency Work - Count 65,996 0 4 0.22 0.47 
Urgent Work – Count 65,996 0 4 0.38 0.60 
Routine Work - Count 65,996 0 6 0.71 0.71 
Work Orders/Requests - 
Count 
65,996 0 5 0.11 0.34 
Plan Operations - Count 65,996 0 5 0.16 0.41 
Recurring Work - Labor Hours 65,996 0 23,925 12.98 191.48 
Emergency Work - Labor 
Hours 
65,996 0 1,021 2.34 12.30 
Urgent Work - Labor Hours 65,996 0 2,777 8.43 40.20 
Routine Work - Labor Hours 65,996 0 13,906 28.54 134.56 
Work Requests - Labor Hours 65,996 0 21,609 12.48 222.58 
Plan Operations - Labor Hours 65,996 0 163,296 35.66 1,390.87 
Recurring Work - Cost 65,996 0 $   1,438,885 $          816.07 $          11,783.79 
Emergency Work - Cost 65,996 0 $        94,346 $          155.33 $               987.73 
Urgent Work – Cost 65,992 0 $      324,345 $          649.49 $            3,816.20 
Routine Work – Cost 65,982 0 $      872,612 $       2,024.48 $            8,703.46 
Work Orders/Requests - Cost 65,949 0 $   5,236,750 $       2,169.11 $          44,768.82 




$       2,292.15 $        100,977.31 
Note.  Negative costs recoded as missing.     
  
 The data, being nested into three distinct levels (time, facilities, and bases) were 
analyzed using Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM). This type of statistical analysis is 
appropriate for clustered data because nested observations violate the traditional regression 
assumption of independence and homoscedasticity. Linear regression models assume that 
all observations are independent; however, for this case study data, observations within 
clusters share common setting (for example, within bases). Homoscedasticity is the 
assumption that, for all values of the predictor variable, the variance around the regression 
line is the same. A commonly used example to describe clustering in HLM datasets are 
students within classrooms within schools. The performance of a student will vary based 
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upon to which classroom they are assigned and to which school they attend. Students within 
the same classroom share something in common that students from another classroom will 
not be exposed to. Variance in schools adds another level of commonality between students 
who attend the same school as compared to students who attend a different school. These 
levels of variance are accounted for using HLM which produces a more accurate 
inferences. 
 For the data studied, the count, labor hours, and costs for a type of work vary 
between years at different facilities within different bases. Each facility has multiple 
observations for each year. Yearly count, labor hours, and costs are nested within facility 
and those facilities are nested within bases. This nested structure of the data dictated the 
assignment of the levels: year as level 1, facility as level 2, and base as level 3. 
 To begin the analysis of the data, the means of the variables were determined and 
plotted against the year to identify aggregate trends in the data. However, these figures do 
not account for differences between bases, facilities, and craft codes. The visual displays 
of trends were followed by fitting an “empty model” without covariates to determine how 
much variance in the outcome occurs at each level. Finally, the full HLM model was fit 
that treated the year and the systems group (the generalized craft code) as fixed effects. 
Fixed effects are factors for which all possible levels are present. In the case of this study, 
the only available years are 2010 through 2017; therefore, each level is included. The same 
is assumed for the systems groups and therefore it is treated as a fixed effect. The outcome 
of fixed effects is analyzed built on a baseline, which was 2010 for the fiscal year (as it 
was the first year chronologically) and plant operations for the systems group (chosen 
arbitrarily). Because systems group is chosen arbitrarily, figures are used to interpret results 
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– given that the model can only be interpreted with reference to the baseline. Due to 
significant skew in the dependent variables, the HLMs were fit to natural log transformed 
versions of the outcomes. Because some of the values were zero and would therefore result 
in an undefined log value, a value of 0.01 was added to each variable before taking the 
logs. Results were un-logged and shown in percentage for interpretation. These results 
were compared with the aggregated analysis which did not factor for base and facility to 
demonstrate the added accuracy of HLM.  
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
 This chapter details the results of the studies. The macro-study is presented first. 
Descriptive statistics are included to create an understanding of the data before analysis. 
The case study follows, with each step described in the Methods section included.  
4.1 The Macro-Study Results 
 Each year, a range of 4,700 to 6,200 requirements were identified to compete for 
funding. Of these, an average of 2,700 were selected each year. Approval rates varied from 
55-63% annually. The projects requested and approved varied in cost and size. Table 4 
shows the annual average cost, maximum cost, and minimum cost for each project type 




Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Project Costs for Each Fiscal Year 
Year and PEC Minimum Maximum Mean 
Fiscal Year 13/14    
   R&M $ 10,000 $ 15,000,000 $ 79,123 
   SUS $ 84,115 $ 8,803,754 $ 29,506 
   Other $ 150 $ 26,000,000 $ 183,015 
Fiscal Year 14/15    
   R&M $ 11,300 $43,000,000 $ 136,696 
   SUS $ 30,000 $ 81,200,000 $ 83,171 
   Other $ 100 $ 99,428,908 $207,533 
Fiscal Year 15/16    
   R&M $ 60,000 $ 15,750,700 $ 673,657 
   SUS $ 5,000,000 $ 81,200,000 $ 546,553 
   Other $ 5,000 $ 13,700,000 $ 505,746 
Fiscal Year 16/17    
   R&M $ 1000 $ 22,216,090 $ 162,160 
   SUS $ 22,048 $ 58,200,000 $ 148,309 
   Other $ 60 $ 15,000,000 $ 87,037 
Fiscal Year 17/18    
   R&M $ 2,500 $ 41,578,300 $ 190,688 
   SUS $ 5,200 $ 21,559,000 $ 172,656 
   Other $ 60 $ 11,600,000 $ 100,417 
 
 The sum of the R&M project costs, SUS project costs, and Other project costs are 
shown in Table 5 for each fiscal year. The total amount allocated for each fiscal year is 
shown for each year. Additionally, to normalize the data, the total for each project type was 
compared to the total approved funding amount for the fiscal year. This information is 
displayed as a percentage in the rightmost column in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Approved Funding and Percentage on AFCAMPs 
 Funds Allocated Percentage 
Fiscal Year 13/14   
   R&M $ 225,499,325 27.13% 
   SUS $ 84,091,496 10.12% 
   Other $ 521,591,612 62.75% 
   Total $ 831,182,433  
Fiscal Year 14/15   
   R&M $ 542,547,235 31.98% 
   SUS $ 330,106,272 19.46% 
   Other $ 823,700,396 48.56% 
   Total $ 1,696,353,903  
Fiscal Year 15/16   
   R&M $ 443,864,076 39.03% 
   SUS $ 360,117,010 31.67% 
   Other $ 333,229,862 29.30% 
   Total $ 1,137,210,948  
Fiscal Year 16/17   
   R&M $ 561,324,903 39.31% 
   SUS $ 515,965,599 36.14% 
   Other $ 350,482,341 24.55% 
   Total $ 1,427,772,843  
Fiscal Year 17/18   
   R&M $ 653,297,275 39.68% 
   SUS $ 591,518,874 35.93% 
   Other $ 401,540,576 24.39% 
   Total $1,646,356,725  
 
 To visualize the data, the percentages per year of R&M versus SUS projects are 
displayed graphically in Figure 6. Other projects were excluded for the sake of comparison 
between the target project types. As Figure 6 shows, the percentage of funds allocated for 
SUS projects each fiscal year has increased. Results show that the percent of funds assigned 
to SUS projects has increased by a total of 26% since fiscal year 2013 and only 13% for 
R&M projects over the same amount of time. R&M percentages also increased, but at a 
slower rate before leveling out in fiscal years 15/16, 16/17, and 17/18.  
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Figure 6: Sustainment and Restoration & Modernization Funds Over the Last Five 
Fiscal Years 
 
 To analyze the gap between SUS and R&M funds, Figure 7 displays the difference 
in the percentage of funds allocated to SUS versus R&M. The graph shows that the percent 
difference between the project classifications has decreased from 17% to about 4% over 
the last five years. This would indicate that the Air Force may be “closing the gap” between 
SUS and R&M activities.  
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Figure 7: Difference in Percentages of Sustainment and Restoration & 
Modernization Funds Over the Last Five Fiscal Years 
  
4.2 The Case Study Results 
 The first objective when analyzing the case study data was to visualize trends over 
time before adjusting for base, facility, or systems group. This was done by taking the 
means and standard deviations across all bases and facilities for each LUC (11, 12, 14, 16, 
18, and 19) and measurement (count, labor hours, and cost). It is worth mentioning for this 
investigation that fiscal year 2017 was only six months in at the time this data was taken 
and that Base 4 data for this year is missing. The sample size was still significantly large 
though; therefore, it was conjectured that the missing information would not alter the 
results shown below significantly. Additionally, the research assumes that, since there is 
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nothing drastically different about the end of the year versus the beginning of the year and 
nothing drastically different about Base 4 versus the other bases, the results are not 
significantly affected. Another important note is that the government shutdown in 2013 
caused budgetary and workflow issues for the DoD and therefore many functions shut 
down at bases throughout the world. Only variables which identified preventative or 
corrective maintenance are displayed below; graphs for work order requests and plant 
operations variables are available in Appendix A. For all graphs, the points represent means 
at each year and the bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Figure 8 shows the trend in 
the mean count of recurring work. Though it is not always linear, there is a positive overall 
trend from 2010 to 2017 in the number of times recurring work was executed. This 
indicates that the number of times maintenance and repair personnel set out to accomplish 
things like preventive maintenance have increased over the years. 
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Figure 8: Means and standard deviations of recurring work count by year across all 
bases and facilities 
 
 Figure 9 is again a measure of the mean frequency of work, but in this case, it is 
emergency work. There is a dip in 2012 and 2013 before another rise and fall. Overall, 
before accounting for facility and base-level variability and controlling for fixed effects, 
the trend is negative.  
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Figure 9: Means and standard deviations of emergency work count by year across all 
bases and facilities 
 
Figure 10 shows the trend of the means of the frequency of urgent work over time. 
Urgent work is sometimes defined as recoded emergency work. Once emergency work has 
mitigated the primary issue (stopped the flow of water from a burst pipe), urgent work 
embodies other requirements to return the facility or equipment to working condition 
(replacing the pipe and the drywall). Though a positive trend permeates the first seven 
years of data, it drops drastically in 2017.  
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Figure 10: Means and standard deviations of urgent work count by year across all 
bases and facilities 
 
 Figure 11 shows the mean frequencies of routine work over time. Routine work is 




Figure 11: Means and standard deviations of routine work count by year across all 
bases and facilities 
 
 Figure 12 shows the means and standard deviations of recurring work hours over 
the years. It is difficult to say that there is any positive or negative trend, especially 
considering the confidence intervals in 2014, 2015, and 2016. The graph demonstrates that 
though the counts of recurring work seem to be rising, the mean labor hours seem to be 
more consistent over the years. 
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Figure 12: Means and standard deviations of recurring work hours by year across all 
bases and facilities 
 
Figure 13 displays the means and standard deviations of emergency work hours by 
year. Here, though the trend is less than apparent, there is a clear jump in the number of 
labor hours spent on emergency work orders in 2014. It could be a possible side-effect of 
the government shutdown which may have left a lot of equipment in disrepair and on the 
verge of failure. 
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Figure 13: Means and standard deviations of emergency work hours by year across 
all bases and facilities 
 
 Figure 14 shows urgent work labor hours means over time. What appears to be a 
steady allocation of labor hours jumps in 2014-2016. Again, urgent work is sometimes 
recoded emergency work and the 2014 spike matches emergency labor hours means. 
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Figure 14: Means and standard deviations of urgent work hours by year across all 
bases and facilities 
 
  Figure 15 shows the means and standard deviations of routine work based on labor 
hours over time. There is a negative trend for this type of work measured in labor hours, 
much like the trend for the mean count values for this type of work. Between count and 
labor hours, routine corrective maintenance has had the most consistent and apparent trend. 
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Figure 15: Means and standard deviations of routine work hours by year across all 
bases and facilities 
 
 Figure 16 displays the means and standard deviations of recurring work inflation-
adjusted cost over the years. There seems to be a slight increase in mean cost in 2014-2016 
before the dip in 2017. Despite this, there seems to be a steady trend for the cost, much like 
the labor hours graph for this work type. 
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Figure 16: Means and standard deviations of recurring work inflation-adjusted cost 
by year across all bases and facilities 
 
Figure 17 shows the means and standard deviations of the inflation-adjusted cost of 
emergency work over time. The trend seems to have a slight negative trend before climbing 




Figure 17: Means and standard deviations of emergency work inflation-adjusted cost 
by year across all bases and facilities 
 
 Figure 18 shows that the means of the cost of urgent work follows much the same 
trend as urgent work labor hours. The seemingly steady trend spikes in 2014-2016. Heavy 
volumes may suggest a period of “catching up” after the government shutdown in 2013 
before the mean cost of urgent work dips back to 2010-2013 levels in 2017. 
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Figure 18: Means and standard deviations of urgent work inflation-adjusted cost by 
year across all bases and facilities 
 
 Figure 19 displays the means and standard deviations of routine work cost by year. 
The trend is slightly negative overall from 2010-2016, before dipping drastically in 2017. 
The trends for routine work have been the most consistent and negative. 
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Figure 19: Means and standard deviations of routine work inflation-adjusted cost by 
year across all bases and facilities 
 
 Observing the trends has revealed that, for the most part, labor hours and cost 
follow approximately the same patterns for all LUCs. Recurring work, though it was 
difficult to identify trends for labor hours and cost, had a positive trend in frequency. An 
increase in recurring or preventive maintenance was one of the goals of the Air Force’s 
new asset management strategy and this trend could indicate that bases are embracing a 
preventive maintenance culture. Emergency work count, labor hours, and cost all jump 
upward in 2014 before tapering downward toward 2016. Aging infrastructure will continue 
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to fail and that is a possible explanation for the apparent increase in emergency work. It 
may take several more years before the effects of increasing preventive maintenance show 
in the data. Urgent work, for all three types of measurement, seems to steadily increase 
throughout the years from 2010-2016 before dipping in 2017. Routine work had mostly 
downward trends from 2010-2017. This could indicate that routine corrective maintenance 
has been less necessary over the years.  
 The next step to analyze the data was to fit the empty model. This provided the 
means to calculate the intraclass correlation coefficients representing the amount of 
variance attributable to each level of the model. They are shown in Table 6. Based on these 
results, very little variance is attributable to level three, the base. Only 1.3% - 6.1% of the 
variance in dependent variables comes from which base at which it occurs. At level two, 
the facility level, 16.2% - 34.4% of the variance for all variables occurs. Level one, the 
year, is accountable for 60.8% - 82% of the variance for all variables. In other words, the 
dependent variables do not vary as much from one base to another as much as they do 
between facilities and from year to year.  
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Recurring Work – Count 0.608 0.344 0.048 
Emergency Work – Count 0.800 0.170 0.030 
Urgent Work – Count 0.715 0.224 0.060 
Routine Work – Count 0.621 0.335 0.044 
Work Orders/Requests – Count 0.819 0.168 0.013 
Plan Operations – Count 0.657 0.305 0.038 
Recurring Work - Labor Hours 0.727 0.221 0.052 
Emergency Work - Labor Hours 0.790 0.180 0.030 
Urgent Work - Labor Hours 0.708 0.231 0.061 
Routine Work - Labor Hours 0.638 0.325 0.037 
Work Orders/Requests - Labor Hours 0.780 0.196 0.024 
Plan Operations - Labor Hours 0.808 0.169 0.023 
Recurring Work – Cost 0.661 0.291 0.047 
Emergency Work – Cost 0.794 0.177 0.030 
Urgent Work – Cost 0.706 0.233 0.061 
Routine Work – Cost 0.622 0.340 0.038 
Work Orders/Requests – Cost 0.821 0.162 0.018 
Plant Operations – Cost 0.772 0.206 0.022 
 
 The final analysis was accomplished using the full models. Table 7 shows the 
model with the log count of each LUC as the outcome. The fixed effects are in the top 
panel and the variance components are in the lower panel. Though the fixed effects results 
are interpreted like regression coefficients, the variance components are included as a 
reference to the part of the model that accounts for the clustering and therefore are typically 
not interpreted. Negative values indicate a negative correlation, positive values indicate a 
positive correlation. Values followed by asterisks are considered statistically significant. 
One asterisk identifies a p-value, or probability value, less than 0.05. This means that the 
value indicates that the null hypothesis should be rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis. Two asterisks indicate a probability value less than 0.01, which constitutes 
 45 
even stronger evidence against the null hypothesis. Three asterisks identify a p-value less 
than 0.001. Standard errors are shown below the values in parenthesis. The first column 
displays the fixed effect, fiscal year in the first panel and the variance components in the 
second panel. Though systems group was also analyzed as a fixed effect, the results do not 
reveal pertinent information to the research questions and therefore those results are only 
included in Appendix B for reference. The first row of the table lists the dependent 
variables, the LUCs. The results present the model with log count of each LUC as the 
outcome. 
 46 
Table 7: Multilevel Models of Work Counts (Year) 
 Recurring Emergency Urgent Routine Work Orders Plant Ops 
Fiscal Year=2011 -0.085** 0.057* 0.048 0.120*** -0.042* 0.247*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) 
Fiscal Year=2012 -0.151*** -0.142*** -0.205*** 0.146*** -0.082*** 0.111*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) 
Fiscal Year=2013 -0.121*** -0.218*** -0.212*** 0.074** 0.036 -0.040 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) 
Fiscal Year=2014 -0.155*** -0.035 0.049 -0.206*** 0.056** 0.080*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) 
Fiscal Year=2015 0.027 0.003 0.238*** -0.374*** -0.010 -0.000 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.019) (0.022) 
Fiscal Year=2016 0.009 -0.095*** 0.352*** -0.554*** 0.214*** 0.037 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.019) (0.021) 
Fiscal Year=2017 -0.029 -0.321*** -0.364*** -1.856*** -0.071** 0.004 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.022) (0.025) 
Level-3 Base       
Variance Component -0.585 -1.056*** -0.543 -0.850** -2.085*** -0.986** 
 (0.319) (0.320) (0.320) (0.326) (0.336) (0.321) 
Level-2 Facilities       
Variance Component 0.235*** -0.275*** 0.060*** 0.303*** -0.599*** -0.080*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) 
Level-1 Error       
Variance Component 0.517*** 0.455*** 0.598*** 0.565*** 0.223*** 0.320*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 65,817 65,817 65,817 65,817 65,817 65,817 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 The year results are analyzed by un-logging the values, which will show the percent 
change from the baseline of 2010. Due to the log-transformation, results were un-logged 
by taking the natural number e to the power of the value of the result minus one. Then, 
multiplication by 100 to see the results in a percentage which signifies the percent 
difference in expected outcome from the baseline. These un-logged values are displayed in 
Table 8. Bold values considered significant in Table 7.   
Table 8: Work Counts Percentage 




Fiscal Year=2011 -8.15% 5.87% 4.92% 12.75% -4.11% 28.02% 
Fiscal Year=2012 -14.02% -13.24% -18.54% 15.72% -7.87% 11.74% 
Fiscal Year=2013 -11.40% -19.59% -19.10% 7.68% 3.67% -3.92% 
Fiscal Year=2014 -14.36% -3.44% 5.02% -18.62% 5.76% 8.33% 
Fiscal Year=2015 2.74% 0.30% 26.87% -31.20% -1.00% 0.00% 
Fiscal Year=2016 0.90% -9.06% 42.19% -42.54% 23.86% 3.77% 
Fiscal Year=2017 -2.86% -27.46% -30.51% -84.37% -6.85% 0.40% 
 
 The results of the year coefficient for recurring work show that, after accounting 
for facility and base-level variability and controlling for systems group, the years 2011 
through 2014 are significantly different from the year 2010, the baseline. Year 2015 
through 2017 are not statistically different from the baseline of 2010. Because the years 
2011 through 2014 have negative values, the expected count would decrease initially but 
then increase in 2015 such that the values would not be statistically different from 2010. 
The -8.15% value means that the outcome in 2011 is 8.15% less than the outcome in 2010. 
The trend would dip initially, dip again into 2012, increase slightly but stay below 2010 
values in 2013, then drop a little farther than 2012 values in 2014. Recall that, in Figure 8 
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before the control for systems group as a fixed effect and facility and base as random 
effects, the trend was different, increasing initially. 
 The results of the year coefficient for emergency work shows that all but years 2014 
and 2015 are significantly different than year 2010. The percentages seem to follow the 
trends from Figure 9 more closely than recurring work count; however, the HLM still 
provides a more accurate model. The same can be said for urgent work counts, where all 
the trends line up more closely to Figure 10. For urgent work counts, all but 2011 and 2014 
are statistically different from 2010. All expected outcomes for routine work count are 
statistically different from the baseline of 2010. Values raise initially, then begin a steep 
decline in the expected value. These results follow a similar trend to Figure 11. Work orders 
and plant operations were less than revealing in their trends, as was observed in the first 
model (Figure 20 and Figure 21 can be found in Appendix A). 
 The years following BULDER’s implementation did not show a statistically 
significant increase in recurring work. The only statistically different values in recurring 
work frequency were in the first few years and those values showed a decrease in the mean 
number of times preventive maintenance was accomplished. Emergency and urgent work 
both saw increases in frequency between 2013 and 2014, but both eventually dipped in 
2017 to a level below 2013 counts. Routine work saw a drastic decrease between 2013 and 
2014 and continued to drop as the years passed.  
 The same model was accomplished for labor hours and the results are shown in  
Table 9. The same procedure for un-logging the values was accomplished and those results 
are displayed in Table 10. Again, bold values are considered statistically significant.
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Table 9: Multilevel Models of Log Labor Hours (Year) 
 Recurring Emergency Urgent Routine Work Orders Plant Ops 
Fiscal Year=2011 0.096* 0.083* 0.068 0.195*** -0.073* 0.307*** 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) (0.044) (0.029) (0.030) 
Fiscal Year=2012 0.057 -0.212*** -0.334*** 0.168*** -0.150*** 0.144*** 
 (0.041) (0.033) (0.042) (0.043) (0.028) (0.030) 
Fiscal Year=2013 -0.064 -0.310*** -0.340*** 0.015 -0.145*** 0.117*** 
 (0.041) (0.033) (0.042) (0.043) (0.028) (0.030) 
Fiscal Year=2014 0.137*** -0.009 0.135** -0.553*** -0.064* 0.100*** 
 (0.041) (0.033) (0.042) (0.043) (0.028) (0.030) 
Fiscal Year=2015 0.305*** 0.041 0.413*** -0.841*** -0.077** 0.011 
 (0.041) (0.033) (0.041) (0.043) (0.028) (0.030) 
Fiscal Year=2016 0.134*** -0.066* 0.628*** -1.143*** 0.020 0.096** 
 (0.041) (0.033) (0.041) (0.043) (0.028) (0.030) 
Fiscal Year=2017 -0.794*** -0.404*** -0.626*** -3.267*** -0.246*** -0.155*** 
 (0.047) (0.038) (0.048) (0.050) (0.032) (0.034) 
Level-3 Base       
Variance Component -0.132 -0.729* -0.126 -0.523 -1.121*** -1.067*** 
 (0.318) (0.320) (0.320) (0.328) (0.323) (0.323) 
Level-2 Facilities       
Variance Component 0.387*** 0.068*** 0.477*** 0.763*** -0.130*** -0.133*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) 
Level-1 Error       
Variance Component 0.961*** 0.757*** 0.974*** 1.016*** 0.587*** 0.645*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 65,817 65,817 65,817 65,817 65,817 65,817 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 10: Work Labor Hours Percentage 




Fiscal Year=2011 10.08% 8.65% 7.04% 21.53% -7.04% 35.93% 
Fiscal Year=2012 5.87% -19.10% -28.39% 18.29% -13.93% 15.49% 
Fiscal Year=2013 -6.20% -26.66% -28.82% 1.51% -13.50% 12.41% 
Fiscal Year=2014 14.68% -0.90% 14.45% -42.48% -6.20% 10.52% 
Fiscal Year=2015 35.66% 4.19% 51.13% -56.87% -7.41% 1.11% 
Fiscal Year=2016 14.34% -6.39% 87.39% -68.11% 2.02% 10.08% 
Fiscal Year=2017 -54.80% -33.24% -46.53% -96.19% -21.81% -14.36% 
 
 For labor hours, the significant values of recurring work occur in all but 2012 and 
2013. Though values seem to be increasing initially, from about 10.08% in 2011, 14.68% 
in 2014 and 35.66% in 2015, they dip back down to only 14.34% higher than the base in 
2016 and then tumble to -54.8% of 2010 by 2017. Emergency work labor hours only rise 
in 2011, the remaining significant values are at various levels below 2010 values. Urgent 
work labor hours dip then rise before tumbling like recurring work did in 2017. Routine 
work expected labor hours once again have a more consistent trend than other work types 
as values initially rise 21.53% above 2010 values in 2011, then only 18.29% in 2012, before 
decreasing steadily from 2014 through 2017. Work order requests labor hours have mostly 
negative values and plant operations are consistently positive before 2017. Routine work 
is the only work type for which trends seem to be consistent and negative. 
 Table 11 shows the inflation-adjusted log cost outcomes. Outcomes followed by 
asterisks are statistically significant. Table 12 displays the un-logged values in percentage. 
Bold values correspond to statistical significance.
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Table 11: Multilevel Models of Log Inflation-Adjusted Cost (Year) 
 Recurring Emergency Urgent Routine Work Orders Plant Ops 
Fiscal Year=2011 -0.015 0.126* 0.078 0.273*** -0.107* 0.425*** 
 (0.061) (0.056) (0.068) (0.069) (0.052) (0.049) 
Fiscal Year=2012 -0.198** -0.361*** -0.562*** 0.265*** -0.220*** 0.169*** 
 (0.060) (0.055) (0.067) (0.068) (0.051) (0.048) 
Fiscal Year=2013 -0.148* -0.519*** -0.557*** 0.037 0.067 0.164*** 
 (0.060) (0.055) (0.067) (0.068) (0.052) (0.048) 
Fiscal Year=2014 -0.016 -0.069 0.176** -0.789*** 0.110* 0.095* 
 (0.060) (0.055) (0.067) (0.068) (0.051) (0.048) 
Fiscal Year=2015 0.332*** 0.104 0.762*** -1.058*** -0.031 0.075 
 (0.060) (0.055) (0.067) (0.067) (0.051) (0.048) 
Fiscal Year=2016 0.233*** -0.088 1.108*** -1.556*** 0.309*** 0.178*** 
 (0.060) (0.055) (0.066) (0.067) (0.051) (0.048) 
Fiscal Year=2017 -0.431*** -0.626*** -0.767*** -4.835*** -0.339*** -0.018 
 (0.069) (0.063) (0.077) (0.078) (0.059) (0.055) 
Level-3 Base       
Variance Component 0.272 -0.245 0.326 -0.069 -0.916** -0.492 
 (0.318) (0.320) (0.320) (0.328) (0.328) (0.323) 
Level-2 Facilities       
Variance Component 0.920*** 0.551*** 0.947*** 1.220*** 0.370*** 0.446*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) 
Level-1 Error       
Variance Component 1.348*** 1.254*** 1.450*** 1.461*** 1.190*** 1.124*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 65817 65817 65813 65803 65771 65812 
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Table 12: Work Cost Percentages 




Fiscal Year=2011 -1.49% 13.43% 8.11% 31.39% -10.15% 52.96% 
Fiscal Year=2012 -17.96% -30.30% -42.99% 30.34% -19.75% 18.41% 
Fiscal Year=2013 -13.76% -40.49% -42.71% 3.77% 6.93% 17.82% 
Fiscal Year=2014 -1.59% -6.67% 19.24% -54.57% 11.63% 9.97% 
Fiscal Year=2015 39.38% 10.96% 114.26% -65.29% -3.05% 7.79% 
Fiscal Year=2016 26.24% -8.42% 202.83% -78.90% 36.21% 19.48% 
Fiscal Year=2017 -35.01% -46.53% -53.56% -99.21% -28.75% -1.78% 
  
 Besides 2011 and 2014, all recurring work cost outcomes are significant. Years 
2012-2013 show values that are 17.96% and 13.76% lower than 2010 respectively. The 
expected values jump to 39.38% and 26.24% above the baseline in years 2015 and 2016 
respectively before dipping to 35.01% below the baseline in 2017. Emergency work 
significant values start higher in 2011, drop below the baseline in 2012-2013, rise above in 
2015, then drop again by 2017. Urgent work significant expected values for cost are about 
43% lower than 2010 in 2012 and 2013 but then rise as high as 203% above the baseline 
in 2016. Values drop about 54% below the baseline in 2017. Once more, routine work 
expected cost values sit above the baseline in 2011 and 2012 then drop steadily from 2014-
2017. Work orders expected values start below, rise above, then dip and plant operations 
has significant values all above the baseline throughout the years. 
 As was seen in the trend data before the HLM model results, urgent and routine 
work had very similar trends in expected cost values compared to expected labor hours 
values. The cost data reveals little that labor hours did not and similarly to those results, 
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the year 2017 returns values both below the baseline of 2010 as well as below the values 
in 2013 when the Air Force’s new asset management policies were first implemented. 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
The Air Force has been combating the “run-to-failure” maintenance approach for 
many years. High failure rates, production downtime, and budgetary concerns have 
motivated new asset management policies to include preventive maintenance. Tools like 
the BULDER program and the policies implementing new asset management practices 
were introduced in 2013. The goal was to help facility managers become more aware of 
assets, their conditions, and the risks incurred by failure of such equipment. The hope was 
to begin accomplishing the right work at the right time. The aim of this study was to 
determine the impact of the Air Force’s new asset management strategy on the 
organization’s funding requests and on preventive versus reactive work trends at base-
level. 
5.1 Macro-Study Discussion 
The switch from reactive to preventive maintenance has known benefits, as 
mentioned in the literature by Ismail Mostafa (2004), Chinese and Ghirardo (2010), and 
Swanson (2001). Sustaining assets is the focus of a preventive maintenance strategy. As 
displayed in Figure 6, trends indicate an increase in funds allocated to sustainment projects 
since 2013. This percentage increase was 26% between fiscal year 2013 and 2017 for 
sustainment projects. Reactive work also increased, but only by 13% in the same timeframe 
which is indicative of the fact that some assets will continue to break down regardless of 
increased preventive maintenance efforts due to existing conditions or age. Assets which 
have been operated in a run-to-failure mentality may be too far gone to prevent failure with 
preventive maintenance. The amount of increase in R&M funds decreased year to year, 
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however, and leveled out between fiscal year 2015, 2016, and 2017. This may indicate that 
fewer assets are failing, thus implying that increasing sustainment efforts may be 
preventing failure. 
Additionally, Figure 7 showed the percent difference between project classifications 
decreased from 17% to 4% over the past five years. This would indicate that the Air Force 
may be “closing the gap” between SUS and R&M activities. These results may suggest 
that the new asset management system and BUILDER program could be affecting a change 
from reactive maintenance and repair to preventive maintenance and repair. It is difficult 
to affirm that these results prove the impact of BUILDER as several other factors may be 
responsible for the trends. As mentioned in the beginning of this thesis, the Air Force asset 
management principles have been in flux for many years. Inconsistency in policy may have 
been the cause. 
Several limitations exist for this study, as policies, budgets, and political climates are 
all factors which can impact the data. First, the integrated priority lists that the Air Force 
releases are lists of approved projects for the upcoming fiscal year. Once the approved lists 
are out, installations begin the work required to begin their project from most urgent to 
least using the risk-based methodology described by Labi (2014). Throughout the fiscal 
year, projects are changed, canceled, or re-appropriated, meaning that the values analyzed 
in this study are not the final amounts spent in each funding pool once the fiscal year has 
ended. Though they are the funds allocated to each pool, a more accurate account of how 
much money or what percentage of money the Air Force actually spent on SUS, R&M, or 
other projects could be obtained if the final spending dollars were studied. This data would 
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be difficult to collect because there is no continuous method for storing or displaying this 
information centrally, yet. 
 Additionally, changing policy and funding sources may have led to a lack of 
standardization in annual expenditure allocation. Asset managers requesting funds for 
projects have had to train and re-learn the specifics of what qualifies as a sustainment or a 
restoration project. For example, the Air Force Instruction 32-1032, Planning and 
Programming Appropriated Fund Maintenance, Repair, and Construction Projects, has 
been revised twice in the past two years. This document defines the thresholds for different 
types of projects. For example, until September 2015 the threshold for a project to be 
considered “minor construction” (a type of R&M) was $750,000, but in the revised version 
it is $1,000,000. Minor construction projects exceeding this amount were placed into a 
different funding category, “unspecified minor military construction” which competes for 
a completely different pool of funds. The increase from $750,000 to $1,000,000 increases 
the number of projects eligible for R&M funding since a R&M project worth $800,000 in 
fiscal year 2015 was considered in a different funding pool but the same project in the fiscal 
year 2016 would be competing for R&M funding. An increase in projects eligible for R&M 
funding may have set percentages for R&M higher in fiscal years 16 and 17. Had the 
change in policy not been made, percentages for those two years may have been less, which 
would have resulted in a decrease in R&M funding requests as opposed to a leveling-out 
as shown in the results. 
 At times, projects are often not cut-and-dry SUS or R&M. Many times a project 
will be developed for a single building or a single unit which will encompass more than 
one type of funding or EEIC. For example, if a facility requires sustainment on the roof 
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and restoration in a breakroom, the funding type that makes up the majority of the project 
will designate the PEC and therefore determine the funding pool from which the project is 
executed. The total cost of the project may not be spent on one type of work or the other, 
but the total cost of the project will come from the funding pool for one type of work or 
the other. This may skew results because projects paid for with R&M dollars may have had 
a portion of the work labeled as SUS or vice versa. Further networking and research are 
required to determine if the final dollar amounts for each EEIC are recorded after funds are 
allocated and projects are completed. 
 Finally, it is sometimes a subjective process when determining if a project is SUS 
or R&M. Air Force programmers are trained thoroughly to differentiate between different 
types of projects; however, it is not always definitive. Identifying project EEICs is not 
always easy and, although check-and-balance procedures are in place, more than 3,000 
projects are requested each year that compete for Operations and Maintenance dollars. It is 
not uncommon for one individual to categorize a project as sustainment repair when it may 
look like restoration and modernization repair on paper. For example, a roof replacement 
would be considered repair but it is SUS repair if it has reached the end of its useful life 
and is replaced with similar materials. However, if the user is looking for an upgrade or 
modernization of an old roof, even if it has reached the end of its useful life and needs to 
be replaced, replacing it with new materials is easily considered R&M repair instead. It 
comes down to the interpretation of the Air Force Instruction 32-1032 and whoever is in 
the final decision-making stage ultimately determines that interpretation. With the newer 
iterations of the instruction, it is difficult to have differences of opinion, but the human 
element which cannot be removed from project definition and classification will always 
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constitute a possibility of error. Considering the limitations listed, this is likely the least 
significant, though worth mentioning. 
5.2 Case Study Discussion 
The case study involved using Hierarchical Linear Modeling to determine the trends 
in LUCs with respect to count, labor hours, and cost clustered within fiscal years, clustered 
within facilities, and clustered within bases. For all LUCs measured in each way, it was 
discovered that the level which accounted for most of the variance in results was the year, 
followed by the facility, followed by the base. LUCs measured in count, labor hours, and 
cost varied more from one facility to the next than from one base to the next and varied 
more from one year to the next than from one facility to the next. The results suggest that 
time is a more significant factor in the prediction of LUC frequency, hours, and cost than 
facility or base. 
 The HLM models, once results were translated into percentages, showed somewhat 
tumultuous trends over time and pre/post 2013. There appears to be little correlation 
between increases in recurring work and decreases in emergency work for count, labor 
hours, and cost. Routine maintenance was the only one of the six LUCs studied to have a 
predictable downward trend for count, labor hours, and cost between 2013 and 2017. The 
declining trend in routine maintenance could suggest that new asset management practices 
have reduced the need for this type of corrective maintenance. However, of the three types 
of corrective maintenance, routine work is the least pressing compared to urgent and 
emergency work. Decreases in routine work are coupled with increases in urgent work 
from 2014-2016 for all measures. Though all work types drop in 2017, increases in urgent 
 59 
work suggest that more equipment was breaking down in more critical ways in the years 
directly following 2013. The work was not so critical as to be coded emergencies but the 
increase, especially in the cost of urgent work over time, suggests that new asset 
management principles have not accomplished the goal to reduce corrective maintenance 
through preventive maintenance in the short term. 
Work orders were included in the study to see if negative trends could identify the 
success of BUILDER to predict work before it was requested by the user. As shown in the 
results, however, trends are less than apparent. Work orders are difficult to identify patterns 
for intrinsically, as they do not always identify problems or equipment breakdowns but 
user requests for things like painting and equipment installation. Little can be inferred 
about the success of BULDER’s predictive capabilities through these results. Plant 
operations were included because it was assumed that this type of work, which is a top 
priority as it affects the function of important utilities, would have a more consistent, 
gently-sloping trend over time. The hope was that significant increases or decreases in plant 
operations could point to underlying issues which may have explained significant increases 
or decreases in other types of work. Trends for this type of work are also difficult to 
interpret as, besides a sharp increase from 2010 to 2011 and mostly down thereafter, 
predictions do not line up significantly with trends for other types of work. 
 All statistically significant values for the year 2017 had expected outcomes for all 
LUCs measured in each way at a value lower than the 2010 and 2013 values. For most 
variables, this was a drastic dip, suggesting that something about the 2017 fiscal year 
resulted in much less work being accomplished overall. A possible influence in 2017 may 
have been the implementation of Tririga, bringing a host of changes to Air Force asset 
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management at the base level. All bases in the case study were scheduled to switch to the 
new CMMS in fiscal year 2016; the focus on training, the growing pains of having a new 
system, and the adaptation to the new classification system could very well have 
contributed to the low values. 
The primary limitation to this study is time. The BUILDER program in particular is 
not a plug-and-play system as it requires inventory input and condition assessments for all 
facilities, systems, and components. There was no Air Force-mandated format for 
equipment inventories in the past; therefore, filling the database has been a task which 
varies in difficulty from base to base. In fact, the timeline for bases to have facilities and 
systems inputted and assessed was September of 2017, four years post-implementation. 
Components and sub-components, except in a few cases for ambitious bases with proper 
resources, have not been uploaded into the system yet. The full impact of BUILDER on 
Air Force asset management will become more clear as the years progress, the inventory 
is more complete, the condition assessments more regular, and the asset managers more on 
the same page concerning the direction and goals of new asset management policies.  
Additionally, the implementation of Tririga introduced another change in Air Force 
asset management practices that likely affected the results, 2017 in particular. This 
combined with the probability that BUILDER data had only just begun to be useful may 
have impacted trends. With Tririga, a new work classification system was rolled-out which 
would replace LUCs with priority levels. Though the switch will not occur until Tririga is 
up and running, the redefinition of work classification may have permeated how asset 
managers assigned work leading up to 2017. 
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 Another factor which may have influenced the results is subjectivity. Much like the 
limitation mentioned for the macro-study, input data into the system is subject to human 
error. The temptation to code a high-ranking officer’s request as an emergency is a 
phenomenon that can exist within base-level personnel. Therefore, training at both top and 
bottom levels is incredibly vital. Though this type of limitation may seem arbitrary giving 
the vast quantity of data collected, it is worth mentioning. 
 This study is significant in that it attempts to expand on the argument that 
preventive maintenance and the sustainment of assets is more beneficial than run-to-failure 
methods. Further, it attempts to identify shifts in work type consistent with the asset 
management culture the Air Force is trying to create through programs like BUILDER and 
new asset management practices. It observes Air Force asset management from two levels. 
The macro-study found trends in requested funds for sustainment and restoration projects. 
The case study revealed trends in preventive versus reactive work at a micro-level.  These 
analyses advance the understanding of how changing maintenance methods is affecting the 
culture, work allocation, and fund-request allocations across the Air Force. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Study Conclusions  
 Sustainment has become more prevalent within U.S. Air Force asset management 
practices. Since 2013, Air Force Asset Management practices have effectively pushed 
project funding in the direction of preventive and predictive maintenance. It is too soon to 
say that the Air Force is saving money or that equipment life has directly increased based 
on the macro-study data. However, it seems that increasing funding allocations toward 
sustainment has at least curbed the increase in funding allocations to restoration projects, 
revealing a possible correlation to increased preventive maintenance and a lessened need 
for corrective maintenance. 
 The case study tells a different story, one that suggests that work accomplished at 
base-level is more tumultuous and patterns less apparent. Though there was a decrease in 
routine reactive maintenance through the years, the increase in urgent work suggests that 
more critical equipment failure was occurring before 2017. Despite the assumption that 
increased recurring preventive maintenance would lead to a decrease in emergency 
corrective work, there is little evidence from the data to support that theory. Considering 
the limitations however, over time these trends may become more apparent. 
6.2  Recommendations 
 As noted by the limitations of the macro-study, efforts could be made to assess the 
amount of money actually spent on SUS versus R&M as opposed to the amount of money 
approved for spending as was the basis of this study. Additionally, determining not just 
allocations to different PECs but breaking it down further into EEICs would present more 
accurate numbers. It would also be interesting to duplicate this study in another five years 
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to determine if SUS ever equals or surpasses R&M funds. Though R&M funds will never 
become nonexistent, it would be interesting to determine the most efficient percentages 
between the two. Over the years, it may be possible to develop an industry benchmark 
identifying the percentage of asset management money that should ideally be allocated to 
proactive versus corrective maintenance. 
 The case study could be expanded in many ways, as the data is extensive and 
continues to grow. An interesting study would include facility characteristic data such as 
age, function, renovation records, and use alterations. Including a variable like facility age 
could create graphs displaying trends in emergency work over time using legacy data and 
the data which continues to be collected now that BUILDER is in effect. The Air Force is 
changing the work classification system from LUCs to priority levels. Training for the new 
classification system is ongoing, but if implemented correctly, emergency work would get 
a priority of one, followed by preventive maintenance and plant operations, then corrective 
maintenance, then enhancement work. This hierarchy ensures that preventive maintenance 
is not “only completed if time allows” but puts it at a higher priority level than corrective 
maintenance. A comparison of count, labor hours, or cost of the LUC system to the count, 
labor hours, or cost of the new classification system could be an interesting and valuable 
study.  
 The case study included only five bases, chosen due to having similar size and 
geographic climate. An extension of this study could be done on other bases throughout 
the U.S. or the world. Expanding the bases studied may provide further insight. Adding the 
base characteristics, like the facility characteristics, would advance the study. 
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 A qualitative study is another way in which this research could be expanded. 
Determining from the asset managers themselves the nature of the changes in asset 
management principles which began in 2013. A survey-based study could reveal whether 
new practices have made an effective difference. 
 Another future study, which could expand literature on the benefits of condition-
based maintenance, could be an analysis of equipment lifecycles before and after Air Force 
policy changes. Determining the effects of less-reactive maintenance on equipment life 
could provide more evidence to the viability of preventive maintenance practices. This 
would require extensive equipment data and a record of all replacements and significant 
corrective maintenance. 
 Further recommendation concerns the BUILDER program itself. Though it has a 
good starting point as a predictor of asset lifecycles, BUILDER may require software 
optimization. The program predicts the reliability of the component level (of the four levels 
identified at the beginning of this thesis: facility, system, component, and subcomponent 
levels), the average of which is used as the overall system’s reliability and, therefore, 
condition index. However, Alley et al. (2015) found that the software’s lifecycle prediction 
algorithms may be inaccurate compared to real-world data. They developed probabilistic 
models using fault trees and fuzzy logic based on risk and then compared the results to 
real-world data. The study revealed that the existing model within the BUILDER software 
could not adequately predict failure in systems (p-value of 1.0) but that the model 
developed using real-world data had a much more significant predictability (p-value of 
0.12). One of the implications of the study is that BUILDER data could become much more 
accurate in the future, thus allowing for preventive maintenance practices on systems to be 
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as effective as they are on the components. This study was an analysis of plumbing, HVAC, 
fire protection, and electrical systems (Alley, 2015). Expanding these data to include the 
other systems assessed by BUILDER will optimize the predictability of systems and allow 
for more effective asset management.  
 66 
APPENDIX A. 
VARAIABLE TRENDS OVER TIME 
 Appendix A shows the values over time for LUCs which displayed no clear trends 
for the specified measurement (count, labor hours, or cost). 
 
Figure 20: Means and standard deviations of work orders/requests count by year 




Figure 21: Means and standard deviations of plant operations count by year across 




Figure 22: Means and standard deviations of work orders/requests hours by year 
across all bases and facilities 
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Figure 23: Means and standard deviations of plant operations hours by year across 




Figure 24: Means and standard deviations of work orders/requests inflation-adjusted 
cost by year across all bases and facilities 
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Figure 25: Means and standard deviations of plant operations cost by year across all 




SYSTEMS GROUP RESULTS 
Systems group was treated as an additional fixed effect. The tables and graphs 
which show the results are below. Outcomes are shown in percentages as compared to the 
arbitrary baseline of plant operations.
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Table 13: Multilevel Models of Work Count (Systems Groups) 
 Recurring Emergency Urgent Routine Work Orders Plant Ops 
Primary Facility Systems 1.555*** 0.782*** 1.109*** 1.153*** 0.091 -0.571*** 
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.070) (0.068) (0.048) (0.053) 
Construction -0.338*** 0.426*** 0.904*** 1.951*** 0.454*** -0.977*** 
 (0.066) (0.062) (0.071) (0.069) (0.049) (0.054) 
Environment and Alarms 1.780*** 0.797*** 0.944*** 0.775*** -0.093 -0.853*** 
 (0.067) (0.062) (0.072) (0.070) (0.049) (0.055) 
Specialized Systems 0.358*** 0.715*** 1.195*** 1.600*** 0.210*** 0.158** 
 (0.073) (0.068) (0.079) (0.076) (0.054) (0.060) 
Contractor Work 0.194* -0.730*** -0.846*** -1.242*** 0.474*** 0.402*** 
 (0.078) (0.072) (0.084) (0.081) (0.057) (0.064) 
Constant -3.557*** -4.520*** -4.399*** -3.022*** -4.351*** -3.457*** 
 (0.259) (0.169) (0.271) (0.206) (0.075) (0.177) 
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Figure 31: Predicted log plant operations count by systems group.
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Table 14: Multilevel Models of Work Labor Hours (Systems Groups) 
 Recurring Emergency Urgent Routine Work Orders Plant Ops 
Primary Facility Systems 1.840*** 1.380*** 2.189*** 2.585*** 0.251*** -0.849*** 
 (0.101) (0.082) (0.102) (0.107) (0.069) (0.073) 
Construction -0.649*** 0.828*** 1.717*** 3.614*** 0.887*** -1.404*** 
 (0.103) (0.083) (0.104) (0.109) (0.070) (0.074) 
Environment and Alarms 1.902*** 1.342*** 1.843*** 1.849*** 0.108 -1.087*** 
 (0.104) (0.084) (0.105) (0.110) (0.071) (0.075) 
Specialized Systems 0.540*** 1.176*** 2.129*** 3.252*** 0.533*** 0.482*** 
 (0.113) (0.092) (0.114) (0.120) (0.077) (0.082) 
Contractor Work -2.501*** -0.827*** -1.412*** -2.159*** -0.544*** -1.427*** 
 (0.120) (0.098) (0.122) (0.128) (0.083) (0.087) 
Constant -3.491*** -4.819*** -4.862*** -2.953*** -4.332*** -3.213*** 




Figure 32: Predicted log recurring work hours by systems group. 
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Figure 33: Predicted log emergency work hours by systems group. 
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Table 15: Multilevel Models of Work Inflation-Adjusted Costs (Systems Groups) 
 Recurring Emergency Urgent Routine Work Orders Plant Ops 
Primary Facility Systems 3.396*** 2.048*** 2.890*** 3.101*** 0.139 -1.917*** 
 (0.147) (0.134) (0.163) (0.166) (0.125) (0.117) 
Construction -1.123*** 1.178*** 2.182*** 4.626*** 1.028*** -2.796*** 
 (0.150) (0.136) (0.166) (0.169) (0.128) (0.120) 
Environment and Alarms 3.458*** 2.014*** 2.370*** 1.967*** -0.327* -2.397*** 
 (0.152) (0.138) (0.168) (0.170) (0.129) (0.121) 
Specialized Systems 0.358* 1.694*** 2.791*** 4.040*** 0.418** -0.083 
 (0.165) (0.150) (0.183) (0.186) (0.141) (0.132) 
Contractor Work -1.433*** -1.374*** -1.813*** -2.941*** 1.202*** -0.218 
 (0.177) (0.160) (0.196) (0.198) (0.150) (0.141) 
Constant -2.513*** -4.758*** -4.450*** -1.070* -3.835*** -1.644*** 
 (0.605) (0.376) (0.641) (0.454) (0.223) (0.300) 
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